A classical local particle hidden-variable model for quantum theory is taken here not to be possible because of the experimental violation of Bell inequalities, whereas a classical local continuum hidden-variable model for quantum field theory is not ruled out. Although Bell considered classical continuum models implausible, this paper argues that they are plausible, and then pursues the consequences of other requirements on them, including the Kochen-Specker paradox and measurement. Since classical continuum models are relatively intractable, a classical continuum interpretation for quantum field theory is also introduced.
Introduction
I take it that the violation of Bell inequalities by experiment rules out any simple local classical particle hidden-variable model for quantum theory (although conceptually extravagant notions of backward causal propagation, for example, are not ruled out, and detector efficiency remains an issue), but I consider here the violation of Bell inequalities in local classical continuum models through relativistically nonlocal statistical dependencies in initial conditions. I take relativistically local dynamics to be a classical requirement, and I will argue in section 2 that statistical dependencies in initial conditions which Bell thought implausible are classically entirely natural, so that a classical continuum hidden-variable model for quantum field theory is not ruled out by the experimental violation of Bell inequalities.
Classical continuum hidden-variable models for quantum field theory are more plausible than has been thought, but they remain relatively intractable. Section 3 discusses, therefore, a style of classical continuum interpretation for quantum field theory that is inspired by an approach of Mackey's to quantum mechanics, which goes a considerable way towards bridging the gap between quantum field theory and classical continuum models.
Seeking classical hidden-variable models for quantum theory has been a minority interest primarily because violation of Bell inequalities has been widely considered to rule out relativistically local dynamics. I also argue in section 4 that the Kochen-Specker paradox, hitherto mostly secondary to Bell's theorem, does not rule out a classical continuum model for particle properties in quantum field theory because the natural theory of measurement for particle properties in a classical continuum model is contextual, in contrast to the natural theory of measurement for a classical particle model, which is non-contextual. However, properties associated with regions of space-time in a classical continuum model, rather than with particles, are non-contextual, and the Kochen-Specker paradox, unlike the violation of Bell inequalities, does constrain classical continuum models for quantum field theory. Sections 5 and 6 elaborate on the rôles of topology, particles, and measurement, and on the rôles of Planck's constant and thermality in classical continuum models.
The violation of Bell inequalities derived for classical particle models and the more-or-less direct application of the Kochen-Specker paradox to classical particle models are good reasons for switching our attention to classical continuum models for quantum field theory -such an approach is in any case also suggested by the experimental superiority of the relativistic quantum theory of fields over the non-relativistic quantum theory of particles. Bell(1976) purports to prove from a definition of locality alone that a classical continuum model predicts two Bell inequalities for observable classical statistics associated with two space-like separated regions R 1 and R 2 , and that quantum theory does not satisfy the same inequalities. Shimony, Horne, and Clauser(1976) , however, prove that there is a flaw in Bell's proof -if observable classical statistics associated with R 1 ∪ R 2 are sufficiently determined by observable classical statistics associated with the intersection of the backward light cones of the two regions, Past(R 1 ) ∩ Past(R 2 ), then the classical continuum model need not satisfy the Bell inequalities. That there must be some flaw in Bell's proof is apparent if we take a special case in which R 1 and R 2 are small parts of a 3-dimensional Cauchy manifold for a classical evolution; initial conditions on R 1 and R 2 are then entirely unconstrained by classical physics, so that any statistics whatsoever are possible for a classical continuum model. Bell's argument and Shimony, Horne, and Clauser's comments are brought together in a review article by d' Espagnat(1984) , and Brans(1988) gives an alternative, quite helpful discussion. Bell(1977) admits this flaw, but claims that for such a result a 'conspiracy' is required. From a classical, deterministic point of view, however, the 'conspiracy' is completely natural. The observable classical statistics associated with R 1 ∪ R 2 are a restriction of a larger set of observable classical statistics associated with a larger single region R ⊃ R 1 , R 2 , which determines the observable classical statistics associated with any region R c contained within the causally supported past of R (that is, all forward light rays from R c pass through R). Classically, R can be as large as we like, so it can be made large enough to contain in its causally supported past a cross-section of Past(R 1 ) ∪ Past(R 2 ) at any chosen time, determining the observable classical statistics that would be expected everywhere on the chosen cross-section, including, in particular, the observable classical statistics associated with the intersection Past(R 1 ) ∩ Past(R 2 ).
Bell inequalities
If the observable classical statistics we measure in regions R 1 and R 2 seem to determine observable classical statistics in the past which we think unlikely, so much the worse for what we think unlikely, unless we actually measure the same statistics in the past and find them to be different. On the basis of classical reasoning, applying the argument of Shimony, Horne, and Clauser(1976) , the violation of Bell inequalities by experiment determines that at some time in the past the intersection of the past light cones of the two space-like separated detection regions largely determines the results of the experiments. Contrary to Bell's claim that this requires a conspiracy, however, this is only to say that the experiment is adequately protected from noise in the environment, since, far enough in the past, the intersection of the past light cones of the two detection regions includes all the apparatus we have used for the experiment. Indeed, if we should fail to observe violation of Bell inequalities in an experiment designed to look for them, we would look for external reasons for the swamping of the quantum correlation, and try to eliminate them. When we succeed, we can reasonably say that the 'conspiracy' is provided by the experimenter.
Bell appeals to the fact that "the disagreement between locality and quantum mechanics is large -up to a factor of √ 2 in a certain sense" (Bell(1977) ), but the same appeal can be made in a classical continuum approach: if an experiment is truly isolated, a maximal violation will be attained, but as small amounts of noise affect the experiment, smaller violations will be achieved, yet still certainly enough to rule out simple ideas of locality in classical particle hidden-variable models.
In some experiments, such as that of Aspect, Dalibard, and Roger(1982) , the choice of measurements made in regions R 1 and R 2 is determined by quantum, electronic, or dynamical systems, even to the extent that the choices are made at space-like separation (Bell's argument against a classical continuum model in Bell(1977) partly depends on a vague discussion of a deterministic mechanical random number generator used to make such measurement choices). The statistics for a subensemble, post-selected according to what measurements we actually made in the detection regions, violate Bell inequalities, but by this, on the basis of classical reasoning, we simply show that we have engineered remarkable correlations in the past, for that subensemble. If pre-selection statistics do not violate any Bell inequalities, it is because there are dependencies of the pre-selection statistics on observable classical statistics outside the intersection Past(R 1 )∩Past(R 2 ), which are screened off by selection -post-selection eliminates the effect of external noise on the space-like separated choices of measurement.
Experiments to violate Bell inequalities can, ultimately, rely on light from distant stars or galaxies to determine the choice of measurements made in regions R 1 and R 2 . As in the previous paragraph, if Bell inequalities are violated, it is because the post-selection statistics are adequately determined by the local experimental apparatus without needing to know the state of the star-light from outside the intersection Past(R 1 ) ∩ Past(R 2 ). This seems implausible to quantum physicists because we have become used to describing the outcome of such experiments using a state in a complex 4-dimensional Hilbert space, in which degrees of freedom describing details of the measurement apparatus are integrated out. If we agree, however, that nonrelativistic quantum mechanics is a reduction of quantum field theory, as we almost always do, such a state is a reduction of a quantum field state in an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space, which describes all the measurement results for quantum field observables associated with the regions R 1 and R 2 , taking the Heisenberg cut to be outside the measurement apparatus rather then within it. Such a state can only be adequately predicted by a quantum field state which describes all the measurement results for quantum field observables associated with some spacelike cross-section of Past(R 1 ) ∪ Past(R 2 ). In general, quantum field theory already commits us to an enormous degree of 'conspiracy'. Nonetheless, if Bell inequalities are violated, we would certainly attribute the violation to the experimenters' ingenuity in ensuring an appropriate initial quantum field state. It is of course very often the case that quantum field observables associated with the region outside the intersection Past(R 1 ) ∩ Past(R 2 ) do not greatly affect quantum field observables associated with R 1 ∪ R 2 . If they do, however, as they do when we use star-light to determine which measurement choices are made, then we must still arrange for the quantum field state for R 1 ∪ R 2 to correspond to a violation of some Bell inequality, or else select a sub-ensemble of the results which do. In a classical continuum model, we have to set up a probability measure over classical field states which evolves to a probability measure over classical field states that violates a Bell inequality, either directly or after post-selection, but this is no greater conspiracy than is apparent in the full quantum field state for the experiment.
Bell ultimately retreats to free will as a necessary axiom from which to derive Bell inequalities. In an interview in Davies and Brown(1986) , he says:
"one of the ways of understanding this business is to say that the world is superdeterministic. That not only is inanimate nature deterministic, but we, the experimenters who imagine we can choose to do one experiment rather than another, are also determined. If so, the difficulty which this experimental result creates disappears. ... In the analysis it is assumed that free will is genuine, and as a result of that one finds that the intervention of the experimenter at one point has to have consequences at a remote point, in a way that influences restricted by the finite velocity of light would not permit."
In actual experiments (carried out so far) intended to violate Bell inequalities, the experimenter effectively only creates the experiment, presses the start button, and returns to collect the results -there is no moment-by-moment intervention that would require the experimenter to be included in a classical description of the experiment. Two detectors would have to be several light-seconds apart before two experimenters could reliably exercise free will at space-like separation. If we are determined to introduce free will in descriptions of future experiments, we could model it, within an approximate, deterministic classical continuum model of an effectively isolated apparatus, as a causal influence coming from outside the backward light cone of the experiment (presumably without taking this model with ontological seriousness). If when free will does act on the apparatus we observe Bell inequality violations after post-selection, we would assume, in this classical model, that post-selection does adequately screen off causal influences external to the apparatus. If we do not observe Bell inequality violations, then the particular post-selection we have chosen does not screen off enough of the causal influences external to the apparatus. In either case, a classical model is not challenged for practical purposes, even though the quite separate philosophical problem of understanding free will in an entirely deterministic universe is of course of interest. The argument of this section almost applies to simple local classical particle hidden-variable models, but the detail of causal processes means that assumptions about locality in the derivation of Bell inequalities for properties of particles are not easily evaded. In particular, if two classical point particles are emitted simultaneously from a central event, their separate states at the time of emission must in effect be partly determined by what the settings of the measurement devices will be at the time they are detected -not a natural consequence of classical causal thinking. In contrast, in a classical continuum model the measurement apparatus and state preparation apparatus constitutes a set of boundary conditions, which determines the structure of the model globally, with an effective nonlocality contained within the initial conditions that is natural in classical continuum physics. We can conclude that violation of Bell inequalities -or in general any correlation whatsoever between observables associated with regions at space-like separation -although it does rule out simple local classical particle hidden-variable models for quantum theory, does not rule out local classical continuum hidden-variable models for quantum field theory.
Indeed, violation of Bell inequalities does not even constrain classical continuum hiddenvariable models for quantum field theory. As well as having a free choice of initial conditions, which as usual we choose differently to model different situations, we also have a free choice of dynamics, since an experiment to observe a violation of a Bell inequality makes only space-like separated measurements, which are only initial conditions to classical continuum physics. Of course many dynamics will be incompatible with the existence of gross matter in a classical continuum model, as one example of many other constraints on a successful classical continuum model, but that is nothing to do with the violation of Bell inequalities.
Classical continuum interpretations
Classical continuum hidden-variable models for quantum field theory will be relatively intractable, and it seems possible we will not even be able to construct toy models. We can understand quantum field theory in an almost entirely classical way without constructing models, however, if we follow an approach of Mackey's to the interpretation of quantum mechanics. For Mackey, quantum mechanics is "basically a revision of statistical mechanics in that one studies the change in time of probability measures but no longer supposes that the motion of these measures is that induced by a motion of points in phase space"(quoted by Jammer(1966, p. 156) ). Applied to quantum field theory, we regard momentum information in both classical and quantum mechanics as the additional information required to describe the evolution of a probability measure over configuration space, even though the additional information required is very different in the two cases. Momentum information in quantum field theory is then a concept particular to quantum field theory, which is not 'real' in the classical continuum model, even though probability measures over configuration space are taken to be a common conceptual foundation. Such an interpretation of quantum field theory is non-relativistic, but of course the formalism of quantum field theory remains relativistic, and the same interpretation is possible for any observer with their own choice of configuration space.
Mackey's approach leads to classical continuum interpretations, in contrast to classical continuum models, with the only difference between them being the way in which the evolution of the common probability measure over a common sample space of classical field configurations is specified. Quantum mechanical momentum describes the evolution of the probability measure over classical field configurations directly, whereas classical momentum describes the evolution of single classical field configurations, indirectly inducing the evolution of the probability measure. Mackey's approach applied to non-relativistic, finite-dimensional quantum mechanics is not particularly helpful, largely because the violation of Bell inequalities remains problematic in its implication of nonlocality, but the evolution of probability measures over configuration space described by a quantum field theory and described by a classical continuum model are at the most elementary level compatible, because in both there is no possibility of faster-than-light signalling.
A classical continuum model is loosely in the same relation of explanatory hypothesis to quantum field theory as statistical mechanics is to the more phenomenological thermodynamics, a relation which remains problematic in detail after over a century, largely because equilibrium probability measures over many-particle phase spaces cannot be proved invariant under classical many-particle evolution. Equally, there is no assurance that any particular evolution in quan-tum field theory can be approximated by a relativistically local classical continuum evolution, or vice versa (particularly in view of the discussion of the Kochen-Specker paradox which follows). Pursuing relationships between quantum theory and classical theory should help us better understand the two theories, but a strict equivalence is ultimately unnecessary, of course, if we can usefully approximate Nature -which can only be approximated with moderate accuracy by the standard model of particle physics -with a classical continuum model. Given the difficulty of constructing an explicit classical continuum model, however, it will be simpler in the short term to take the possibility of such a model as a basis for classical continuum interpretations of quantum field theory, although classical continuum interpretations can be understood without reference to classical continuum models.
The Kochen-Specker paradox
The Fock space formalism of quantum field theory is in general interpreted as a formalism of particle properties, rather than as a formalism of properties of space-time regions, even though quantum field theory can be formulated as a theory of properties associated with spacetime regions (see, for example, Haag(1996) ). The validated results of quantum field theory are generally described in the vocabulary of particle physics, in such terms as lifetimes, crosssections, and particle masses, so one approach to the Kochen-Specker paradox is to model only particle properties in a classical continuum model for quantum field theory. Particle language is prevalent in discussions of quantum field theory, but the distinctions and relationships between particle properties in quantum field theory and properties of space-time regions have not been very clearly elucidated.
It is necessary, consequently, to outline the properties a classical continuum model apparently must have to agree with the most obvious particle phenomena. Firstly, a model must be significantly nonlinear if it is to result in some circumstances in stable localized particles, usually known as solitons. Secondly, for circumstances when a stable localized particle is not possible, as when we heat a substance to make it become a gas, in which individual particles are not localized and we cannot identify them separately within the gas, nonetheless the aggregate number of particles and anti-particles is invariant, so a model will also have to be constrained enough to result in nontrivial topological classes, essentially as analogues of superselection sectors.
In such a model, the properties of space-time regions are well-defined and non-contextual, but the properties of particles are contextual, because the boundary of a particle can only be defined in the context of the details of a particular experimental apparatus. A real measurement device is in principle part of the continuous world, but is certainly not at absolute zero temperature, so there must be some uncertainty about where the measurement device ends and where the measured system begins. When we remove the measurement device from our description, which we do in classical physics no less than we do in quantum theory, we have to make a pragmatic choice, because we have no natural boundary, so that what part of the measurement results is due to the measurement device and what part is due to the measured system is intrinsically not well-defined. This is only to say that measurement of particle properties in a classical continuum model is naturally contextual, avoiding the Kochen-Specker paradox (see, for example, Redhead(1987, p. 135) ).
Non-contextuality is so much an obvious consequence of a particle model, and so obviously simpler than contextuality, that contextual measurement is rarely considered. Contextuality, when considered abstractly, seems pernicious, because objects have no properties we can rely on, so we cannot discuss our world coherently. Considered concretely, however, as a natural consequence of a classical continuum model, objects are not associated in a well-defined way with space-time regions, but space-time regions have well-defined properties, so we can still discuss our world coherently, even though it must be sufficient only to be able to make pragmatic determinations of where objects are.
The Kochen-Specker paradox does not rule out a classical continuum model as a foundation for particles with contextual properties, as a model for properties of particles in quantum field theory; but it does rule out a classical continuum model for quantum field theory considered as a field theory, since properties of space-time regions are well-defined and non-contextual. If we wish to construct a classical continuum model for quantum field theory considered as a field theory, even though this does not seem at first sight to be empirically necessary, we cannot avoid the Kochen-Specker paradox through contextuality. An alternative approach is to deny that all observables in quantum field theory correspond to observables in the classical continuum model, instead taking observables in the classical continuum model to be 'real' -this is to deny Redhead's Reality Principle R (Redhead(1987, p. 135) ). The de Bröglie-Bohm model, for example, can be understood to avoid the Kochen-Specker paradox by taking measurement of configuration space observables to be fundamental, with quantum theoretic momentum and other observables essentially derived concepts (see, for example, Pagonis and Clifton(1995) ).
To discuss the de Bröglie-Bohm approach in detail would be inappropriate here, since it introduces a nonlocal dynamics, which we should assume not to be necessary until we are forced to it by more than violation of Bell inequalities. We can nonetheless follow the kinematic structure of the de Bröglie-Bohm model in regarding momentum information in both classical and quantum mechanics as the additional information required to describe the evolution of a probability measure over configuration space, as we did in classical continuum interpretations of quantum field theory. It is unfortunate that although we necessarily have to reject the formulaically generated nonlocal de Bröglie-Bohm dynamics, considered "too cheap" by Einstein (quoted by Holland(1993, p. 23) ), I cannot offer anything better than intelligent trial and error as a way to generate suitable classical continuum model dynamics.
A further possibility for avoiding the Kochen-Specker paradox is to follow the non-contextual rational models of Meyer(1999) and Kent(1999) , which approximate to finite and countable dimensional algebras of operators, so that it seems reasonable to conjecture that a non-contextual classical continuum model can approximate to the higher cardinality type III 1 von Neumann algebras of Local Quantum Physics (again, see Haag(1996) ). To repeat, however, resolving the Kochen-Specker paradox for a classical continuum model for quantum field theory considered as a field theory seems to be empirically superfluous, since particle properties alone are apparently sufficient.
Topology, particles, and measurement
The topological properties required of a classical continuum model can best be introduced through a very simple model. First of all, make a loop of paper with a single twist. Unless we break the paper, there will always be exactly one twist in the loop -or at least there will be one twist in aggregate, since there can be twists and anti-twists (i.e. twists in the opposite direction). With specially elastic paper, the twist might always be quite localized, so that we can say approximately where the twist is, but if we "heat up" the loop by introducing many twists and anti-twists it will eventually be impossible to tell where the one twist is, even though we know it is still a loop with one twist, since the loop has not been broken. If we now "cool down" the loop by removing twists and anti-twists, there will eventually be just one twist again, which will again be localized, but after such a process we will only be able to describe probabilistically where the twist will be. As well as the topological structure, a description of the measurement transition also requires thermal concepts, since a stable topological soliton solution of classical field equations has no other incentive to become unstable (that is, to become delocalized) and later to become stable again.
In quantum field theory, the aggregate number of Fermions and anti-Fermions of a particular type is conserved through superselection principles, but there is no such conservation rule for bosons. Photons can be freely created or destroyed, but an electron can only be created or destroyed at the same time as a positron (ignoring the complication of neutrinos). A discussion of detection devices, however, relies only on the nonlinearity of the detection devices, not on any nonlinearity associated with a particle beam. Photons are never localized alone, but their energy and angular momentum can be localized within a substantial fermionic structure. We cannot talk of photons as particles at all in a classical continuum model. A similar view has of course been taken in semi-classical approaches in which a classical electromagnetic field interacts with quantum oscillators (see, for example, Greenstein and Zajonc(1997, ch. 2) , which also discusses experiments not accommodated by semi-classical models).
Despite being Fermions, electrons are also apparently only localized in the presence of atomic nuclei; electromagnetic charge alone is apparently not sufficient to localize a particle. When an electron is localized in an experimental apparatus without being immediately part of a structure that contains localized atomic nuclei, it is always because of a confining electromagnetic field, which we can only generate by using a structure that contains localized atomic nuclei. Since SU (3) gauge field interactions (in the conceptual system of quantum field theory -interactions may find a different expression in a classical conceptual system) are unique to hadrons, which often are localized, it seems that SU (3) gauge field interactions are necessary to localize classical matter. Even for Fermions it is quite difficult to talk about particles in a classical continuum model because only for the whole space-time of the model is the aggregate number of particles and anti-particles well-defined. We can talk of the number of particles in a smaller region than the whole space-time of the model only if the number of particles in the region is constant, and then only in pragmatic terms. When a preparation device emits particles, we can only count the number of particles in the preparation device at the beginning and at the end of the experiment; we cannot talk of a particle being emitted at an exact time. Equally, when we observe an event, we cannot talk of there being a single emission event in the preparation device that corresponds to it, even if there are single emission events in the model. We cannot even properly talk of an observed event corresponding, say, to one-tenth of one emission event, three-tenths of another emission event, and the rest from a third emission event, just because individual particles are not well-defined. Nonetheless, between the beginning and the end of an experiment, we can talk pragmatically of an overall number of particles having been transferred, since the number of particles in the emitter and detector before and after the experiment are well enough defined to talk about.
Against the emphasis in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory that wave and particle aspects are complementary, and strongly against the common adoption in other interpretations of an emphasis on particle aspects, a classical continuum model is almost entirely a wave theory, in which particles are a consequence of the topological structure and nonlinear dynamics. Between emission and detection in an experiment that cannot be adequately described by classical particle mechanics, the existence of particles as separate objects is extremely tenuous. In a two slit interference experiment, for example, we cannot speak of a particle passing through one slit or through the other slit, since it is only at the emission and detection devices, before and after the experiment, that the particles which make up the beam are localized. We should take to heart the Copenhagen interpretation's demand that between emission and detection we should not talk of the properties of a particle; a demand we can more happily accept in the context of a classical continuum model.
Planck's constant and thermality
In a classical continuum model we can understand Planck's constant of action as a Poincaré invariant measure of field fluctuations that is a 4-dimensional analogue of the thermal energy kT , which can be understood as a 3-dimensional Euclidean invariant measure of field fluctuations. That is, Planck's constant can be regarded as no longer a fundamental constant, but effectively as a measure of "4-dimensional temperature". Stochastic interpretations of quantum theory have taken a similar view of Planck's constant (see, for example, Jammer(1974, ch. 9) ). We can compare, for example, the vacuum state of a quantized Klein-Gordon field with equilibrium in the Gaussian model in statistical field theory. The Hamiltonians of the two models are superficially similar, respectively 
(see, respectively, Itzykson and Zuber(1980, p. 119) and Binney et al.(1993, §8.1) ), where f (x) is a test function used to construct either a quantum or a classical observablê
The σ 2 QF T measure d 3 k/(2π) 3 2 √ k 2 + m 2 = δ(k 2 − m 2 )d 4 k/(2π) 4 is Lorentz invariant, whereas the σ 2 SF T measure is not; the difference between the functional forms is obviously significant, but Planck's constant and kT nonetheless control the amplitude of the fluctuations in comparable ways in the two theories, justifying the claim that Planck's constant can be regarded as a measure of "4-dimensional temperature", at least in the case of free fields.
Quantum field theory effectively unites relativistic causality with thermal physics without introducing any faster-than-light causality. In contrast, in a classical description of a crystal, say, we would describe wave properties with a relativistic wave equation (with the speed of light replaced by the speed of sound), but we would model thermal properties by introducing molecules which occasionally travel much faster than the speed of sound. Of course such a model is anathema to special relativity, but the speed of sound is an emergent property in classical statistical mechanics, and thermal properties of a crystal are often only significant at a second approximation, so in the less principled world of model construction insisting that the speed of light can never be exceeded may not be necessary for empirical adequacy.
To classically describe phenomena described by quantum field theory without giving up special relativity, we will have to integrate classical wave and thermal physics as seamlessly as quantum field theory does. In a classical wave theory, if we introduce a wave that is localized within a small region, then the wave will always remain localized in an expanding region. When we introduce the thermal properties of a crystal, however, a localized wave instantly results in an exponentially reducing field at arbitrary distances. This matches the behaviour of nonrelativistic wave functions. Quantum field theory, however, has the classically unusual property of never allowing a wave to be localized within a small region. An exponentially reducing field at infinity is always required in the initial conditions in quantum field theory. On reflection, this is a constraint on the initial conditions that should be required in any classical physics which integrates classical wave and thermal physics, since it then seems impossible to prepare a state that is so localized in the presence of uncontrollable thermal fluctuations. A recent paper (Karpov et al.(2000) ) suggests that a positive energy for the initial conditions may be equally sufficient to ensure such a constraint in classical physics as it is in quantum physics.
The nonlocality of states in quantum field theory has traditionally been seen as problematic, because initial conditions of classical relativistic wave equations are seen as localizable at will. Equally, the instantaneous evolution of a localized state to a nonlocalized state in a nonrelativistic quantum theory, has also traditionally been seen as problematic, because classical relativistic wave equations limit the speed of propagation. In a classical continuum physics which introduces uncontrollable fluctuations properly, whether relativistically or non-relativistically, the properties of quantum field theory and of non-relativistic quantum theory seem entirely natural.
Conclusion
Violation of Bell inequalities does not rule out or even constrain a relativistically local classical continuum hidden-variable model for quantum field theory. The story is far from as closed as Bell tells it.
The Kochen-Specker paradox remains problematic, but there are natural strategies available in a classical continuum model to avoid the strictures of the Kochen-Specker paradox that are not as naturally available in a classical particle model. Even if a classical continuum model for a quantum field theory is impossible because of some new no-go theorem, understanding the impossibility in detail should give some insight into quantum field theory.
Adopting a classical continuum interpretation and/or a classical continuum model for quantum field theory returns us conceptually to before the EPR paper, allowing us again to think of
